of the organism adds to the purely additive description of the materialist is the recognition of functional significance of the parts in terms of the maintenance of the life of the whole ; or, if you like, the meaning of the parts in relation to the whole: and such understanding is not without value. But, as said above, it leaves us still hungry for true dynamic explanation.

Of the organicists whose expositions we have reviewed, Bertalanffy alone explicitly avows the need for a dynamic theory of the wholeness of the organism ; and he, after reviewing possibilities and rejecting various suggestions that seem at first sight to be compatible with a biology that rejects all psychical and teleological activities as unreal, metaphysical, unscientific, and only fit for the futile maunderings of psychology, is driven to confess that no such theory is in sight.

Goldstein, whom I have classed with the organicists, differs from the rest of them in frankly rejecting in principle the possibility of mechanistic explanations and in recognizing the teleological nature of organic processes. But he remains content, like some of the other organicists, with mere insistence on the fact of unity of the organism and with full recognition of its rich capacities for adaptive activities, declining all speculation, all hypotheses as to the ground of the unity and wholeness on which he so strongly insists.

We found that in another respect also organicism is open to severe criticism ; namely, it overstates the unity and wholeness of the organism and relies too much upon mere emphasis on wholeness, as a substitute

for explana-
tion in terms of dynamic hypotheses. This
defect we
illustrated by citing many instances in which
the regulative
phenomena (for the explanation of which
the influence
s